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Abstract 
To assist with progress towards the United Nations Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) in developing countries, the international community is scaling-up foreign 
aid to record levels. Concurrently, there are concerns that additional aid will not be 
used effectively due to a problem of absorptive capacity in recipient countries. 
Empirical studies lend support to these concerns with many finding that there are 
diminishing returns to foreign aid. This paper reviews the extensive aid effectiveness 
literature to identify the various dimensions of absorptive capacity. It proceeds by 
devising a composite index of absorptive capacity for individual recipient countries 
which can assist policymakers in guiding the allocation of their aid. The relevance of 
the index is confirmed through its employment in a standard empirical model of aid 
effectiveness. The paper highlights the developing countries that currently receive 
high levels of aid relative to their estimated level of absorptive capacity. 
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1. Introduction 
In 2009, total Official Development Assistance (ODA) from members of the OECD’s 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) increased to US$119.6 billion, the highest amount 
of annual assistance ever recorded (OECD, 2011a). The increase in aid has been met with 
widespread support as efforts intensify to achieve the United Nations’ Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) by 2015. However, there are also concerns within the policy community around 
whether additional aid will be used effectively in some countries due to a problem of absorptive 
capacity. Such concerns are reinforced by a number of recent academic studies that examine the 
impact of foreign aid on economic growth. A robust empirical finding from the empirical aid 
effectiveness literature is that there are diminishing and eventually negative returns to foreign 
aid.1 The relationship between the level of aid and its incremental impact on growth takes the 
form of an inverted-U shape. This implies that past a certain level, the incremental impact of aid 
starts to fall and donors start getting ‘less bang for their buck’.  
 
This finding has important implications for the inter-country allocation of aid. As donors 
continue to scale-up their assistance, it is important that the effectiveness of aid at promoting 
growth and reducing poverty is not compromised by over-aiding recipients relative to their levels 
of absorptive capacity (Feeny and McGillivray, 2011). In order to maximize the impact of aid, 
therefore, absorptive capacity should be included in models and formulae which guide the 
allocation of aid across countries. This necessitates the measurement of absorptive capacity at 
the country level which is the primary objective of the paper.  
 
A number of aid allocation models have been proposed by the academic literature (Cogneau and 
Naudet, 2007; Collier and Dollar, 2002; Llavador and Roemer, 2001; and Wood, 2008). Variants 
of these models have been adopted by some multilateral and bilateral aid donors. Based on these 
models, aid allocation formulas are derived which seek to guide the allocation of annual aid 
budgets across recipient countries according to their size, their level of need and their ability to 
use aid effectively (often referred to as performance) This latter component is usually determined 
by a recipient’s policy and institutional environment. 
 
Yet, there are a number of Absorptive Capacity Constraints (ACCs) that might limit the ability of 
recipient countries (and donor agencies) to put aid flows to good use. These ACC are not 
currently accounted for in aid allocation models. This paper reviews the extensive literature on 
                                                 
1 See for example, Hansen and Tarp (2000, 2001), Dalgaard and Hansen (2001), Lensink and White (2001), Hudson 
and Mosley (2001), Roodman (2004), Clemens et al. (2004) and Dalgaard et al. (2004). 
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aid effectiveness to distinguish between the following five types of ACC: (i) human and physical 
capital constraints; (ii) policy and institutional constraints; (iii) macroeconomic constraints; (iv) 
deficiencies in the manner in which the international donor community delivers its foreign 
assistance; and (v) social and cultural constraints.  A combination of these constraints in recipient 
countries limits the effectiveness of additional aid, justifying the development of a Composite 
Index of Absorptive Capacity (CIAC) for individual countries. The relevance of the index is 
confirmed through its employment in a standard empirical model of aid effectiveness.  
 
Donors currently using existing indices and models to guide the allocation of their aid include 
the US’s Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) whereby low income countries are rated 
according to a number of criteria relating to governing justly, investing in people and promoting 
economic freedom. Another is the World Bank’s system of Performance-Based Allocations for 
its aid distributed to low income countries. This is largely based on its Country Performance and 
Institutional Assessment (CPIA) ratings.2 Since absorptive capacity is a crucial determinant of aid 
effectiveness, the adoption of the CIAC into such models can help maximize the impact of aid 
across countries. 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the academic literature to 
identify the various dimensions of absorptive capacity. Section 3 discusses the methodology 
adopted in this paper to develop a CIAC. The data and empirical techniques employed are also 
examined. Section 4 employs the CIAC in a standard empirical model to confirm its relevance to 
aid effectiveness. The section also provides rankings of developing countries according to their 
level of absorptive capacity and implications for the levels of aid that they are currently receiving 
are discussed. Finally, Section 5 concludes by suggesting a number of possible responses to 
absorptive capacity from the international community.  
 
2. Dimensions of absorptive capacity 
The existence of ACCs and diminishing returns to foreign aid has long been recognised. Chenery 
and Strout (1966) first documented diminishing returns to aid caused by the problem of 
absorptive capacity over 40 years ago. However, the issue is becoming increasingly pertinent as 
international donors scale up their aid to record levels and, arguably, it is a problem that has 
largely been ignored by policymakers. In economics, the concept of absorptive capacity is well 
known and often relates to the ability of a country to utilise capital productively. It is often found 
                                                 
2 CPIA ratings are based on sixteen indicators relating to economic management, structural policies, policies for 
social inclusion and public sector management and institutions. 
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that there are diminishing returns to capital. In other words, the productivity of capital 
(investment) falls as its level increases. Since international donors often fund capital and 
investment, this interpretation of absorptive capacity can readily be applied in the context of 
foreign aid. However, not all foreign aid is provided to fund profitable investment opportunities 
and therefore a broader view of the concept is required. This section reviews the extensive 
literature that investigates the effectiveness of foreign aid to identify the various ACCs which 
might exist in developing countries. It starts by examining the studies that have identified ACCs 
by establishing the existence of diminishing returns to foreign aid using cross-country data. It 
proceeds by discussing the findings from studies that have identified the existence of specific 
ACCs.  
 
The vast majority of the aid effectiveness literature has examined the impact of foreign aid on 
per capita economic growth rates in recipient countries. Virtually all studies that test for 
diminishing returns confirm the existence of such a relationship (with respect to growth), 
providing strong empirical evidence for the existence of ACCs in recipient countries (see, for 
example, Hansen and Tarp, 2000, 2001; Lensink and White, 2001; Dalgaard and Hansen, 2001; 
Hudson and Mosley, 2001; Dalgaard et al, 2004; Roodman, 2004; and Clemens et al, 2004; and 
Feeny and McGillivray, 2010).3  
 
These studies typically estimate the following equation: 
 
α β β β μ2 /1 2 3 1,...,i i i i ig a a Z i n            (1) 
 
where gi is per capita GDP growth in aid receiving country i, ai is aid relative to GDP to that 
country, Zi is a vector of additional variables, μi is a residual, α is a constant and β1, β2 and β3 are 
coefficients. The signs of β1 and β2 are found to be positive and negative, respectively implying 
an inverted-U shaped relationship between aid and growth depicted in Figure 1 below. 
 
                                                 
3 The vast aid effectiveness literature consists of other studies which find the impact of foreign aid on growth varies 
according to a number of recipient country characteristics. These characteristics include whether the recipient is 
located in the tropics (Dalgaard et al., 2004), its level of structural vulnerability (Guillaumont and Chauvet, 2001), the 
degree of democracy (Svensson, 1999) and whether it is experiencing a post-conflict period (Collier and Hoeffler, 
2004). The literature also includes a minority of studies which fail to find a statistically significant relationship 
between aid and growth (Easterly et al. 2004; Rajan and Subramanian, 2008). 
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The incremental impact of aid on growth increases for all levels of aid up to the threshold a*. 
Once this threshold is reached, diminishing returns sets in and the incremental impact of aid 
starts to fall due to the existence of absorptive capacity constraints  If donors have the objective 
of maximizing growth in recipient countries, they should provide aid up to (but no beyond) the 
level a*. It is possible that other (non-growth) considerations as well as political factors might 
justify levels of aid in excess of a*, at least in the short term. However levels of assistance which 
exceed a** are very hard to justify since it provides the level of assistance at which negative 
returns sets in. At such high levels, aid might actually be doing more harm than good. 
 
Figure 1: The relationship between foreign aid and economic growth 
 
Source: Feeny and McGillivray (2011) 
 
From equation (1) it follows that ceteris paribus: 
 12
β
2 β
*
ia
        (2) 
and: 
1
2
β
β
**
ia
        (3) 
 
Equations (2) and (3) imply that a** must be twice the level of a*. 
 
Various estimates of a* are provided by empirical studies. Drawing on the parameter estimates 
from a number of these studies, Feeny and McGillivray (2011) estimate that diminishing returns 
ai*
Contribution 
to Growthi
Aid/GDPiia
**
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set in when foreign aid accounts for about 20 per cent of a recipient’s GDP and that donors 
should exercise caution in providing a level of aid in excess of this threshold. However, since this 
threshold is estimated from studies using cross-country data, it represents an average threshold 
for developing countries as a group. The specific level of aid at which diminishing returns begin 
will vary across recipient countries. This provides the motivation for constructing an index of 
absorptive capacity for individual countries.4  
 
Aid effectiveness studies point to a number of different capacity constraints which help explain 
the finding of diminishing returns to foreign aid. The following types of capacity constraints are 
identified: capital constraints; policy and institutional constraints; macroeconomic constraints; 
donor practices; and social and cultural constraints.5 Each type of ACC is discussed below.  
 
2.1 Capital constraints 
Capital constraints include human and physical capital constraints. Low levels of human capital 
might prevail in recipient country public sectors limiting their ability to put additional amounts of 
aid to good use. For example, at a central (administrative) level, public sectors might face a 
shortage of skilled or adequately trained civil servants to manage and administer foreign aid flows 
from overseas. Given the way in which flows are administered, public sector officials are likely to 
be responsible for a broad range of reporting requirements to different aid donors. They will also 
be responsible for hosting donor missions and dealing with staff from overseas agencies. All of 
these activities will take valuable time and resources away from core government tasks and 
functions. Recipient public sector staff might also lack the necessary skills and technical expertise 
for aid project identification, preparation and evaluation (Reyes, 1993). The constraint becomes 
more binding with poor donor practices in delivering aid, discussed below. Reducing this and the 
institutional administrative burden of aid is one of the objectives of the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness to improve its quality. 
 
Human capital constraints also exist at a sector level. In particular, recipient country health and 
education sectors are increasingly being targeted as donors seek to assist with progress towards 
the MDGs. However, a lack of qualified or trained staff in health and education in some 
                                                 
4 The strong evidence for the existence of ACCs should not provide grounds for donors to abandon the scaling up 
of their aid programs. Feeny and McGillivray (2011) note that if ODA accounted for 20 per cent of GDP in all 
recipient countries, the global aid budget would need to increase to US$1,466 billion. This is a level far in excess of 
the levels implied by an outright doubling of aid, or where it accounts for 0.7 per cent of all donors GNI.  
 
5 See de Renzio (2005) and Bourguignon and Sundberg (2006) for other reviews and typologies of ACCs. 
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countries will impede the effectiveness of additional resources aimed at achieving these goals. 
Such concerns are substantiated by the McKinsey Group (2003), which finds that human 
resources are the primary barrier to scaling up immunisation programs (cited in Dreesch et al., 
2005). Moreover, Killick (2005) argues that there is a worsening shortage of human resources in 
Africa compounded by the brain drain and high mortality rates.  
 
Physical capital constraints relate largely to infrastructure constraints. Extensive and well 
maintained infrastructure will play an important role in ensuring additional financial resources 
will lead to tangible progress towards the MDGs. Delivering essential services such as health, 
education, water and sanitation will require physical infrastructure (such as schools, hospitals and 
clinics) but also transport infrastructure (such as roads, bridges and ports). Improving 
telecommunications, energy infrastructure and irrigation systems will also assist in improving 
productivity and securing economic growth. In the absence of such infrastructure, the costs in 
delivering services to intended beneficiaries in rural areas will remain very high.  
 
2.2 Policy and institutional constraints 
A well cited finding in the empirical aid effectiveness literature is that weak macroeconomic 
policy and institutional environments undermine the positive impact of foreign aid (Burnside and 
Dollar, 2000, 2004; Collier and Dollar, 2002). While the robustness of this finding is often 
disputed, there is a widely held view that recipient countries should have appropriate economic 
and social policies in place in order to maximise the contribution of additional aid.  
 
Strong institutions offer incorporate effective financial management systems; strong systems of 
accountability and transparency; high levels of law and order; a strong legal and judicial 
environment; and a democratic electoral process. Mechanisms also need to be in place to deal 
with the administration of aid programs including long-term national development plans and 
medium-term development strategies to which aid programs can be aligned. An effective 
planning department is also required to ensure that aid is aligned with national priorities and is 
coordinated effectively among different donors. For these reasons, the absence of effective 
policies and institutions can limit the effectiveness of additional aid.6  
                                                 
6 While aid can be used to improve policies and institutions in recipient countries, at high levels it can also become 
part of the problem, leading to institutional destruction and weak systems of domestic accountability. A number of 
studies identify adverse impacts of foreign aid on institutions and the level of governance in recipient countries 
(Knack, 2000; Bräutigam and Knack, 2004; Killick, 2005; Stockmayer, 2005; Moss et al., 2006). These findings are 
not entirely undisputed (see Tavares, 2003; Coviello and Islam, 2006) but they do point to a need to be cautious 
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The response of a recipient’s fiscal policy to aid is another important aspect of this constraint. 
Specifically, recipient governments can change their spending and revenue raising behaviour in 
response to foreign assistance. If foreign aid is fungibile, it might lead to an increase in 
expenditures viewed as undesirable by donors or recipients might devise inappropriate 
expenditure plans. Additional aid flows might also increase the scope for corruption and 
financial mismanagement. Arguably the most important concern is whether large amounts of aid 
reduce the amount of tax collection efforts by recipient governments. Very low tax bases relative 
to aid flows can also lead to a high level of aid dependency, undermining democracy since 
recipient governments become more accountable to their aid donors than to their own 
electorates.7  
 
2.3 Macroeconomic constraints 
Very high levels of foreign aid can potentially have adverse macroeconomic impacts. Such 
impacts are widely referred to as Dutch disease impacts of aid. High levels of assistance can lead 
to an appreciation of a recipient’s Real Exchange Rate (RER) and therefore to a loss of export 
competitiveness (Heller, 2005). This problem arises when the increase in demand for a 
recipient’s currency leads to a nominal exchange rate appreciation and when aid is spent on 
domestic (non-tradeable) goods and services, thereby increasing their price and raising costs, or 
drawing resources away from the export (tradeable) sector. Given the importance of the export 
sector in many developing countries, these so-called Dutch disease impacts could undermine the 
positive impacts of aid on growth and poverty education. 
 
However, the findings in the literature relating to macroeconomic constraints are ambiguous. 
Evidence of the Dutch disease impacts of aid are confirmed by Rajan and Subramanian (2005) 
for a sample of developing countries, by Adenauer and Vagassky (1998) for a sample of African 
countries, by Laplagne et al. (2001) for some Pacific countries, and by White and Wignaraja 
(1992) in the case of Sri Lanka. However, little or no evidence of aid-induced Dutch disease has 
been found by Ouattara and Strobl (2003) and Killick and Foster (2007) in samples of African 
                                                                                                                                                        
when scaling-up, in order to ensure that additional aid does not undermine the objective of strengthening 
institutions. 
7 The empirical evidence on the relationship between aid and tax is mixed. Results from fiscal response studies are 
clearly recipient specific, with aid found to lead to either increases or falls in tax revenues depending on the sample 
of countries under consideration. Using other techniques, Bräutigam and Knack (2004) found that higher levels of 
aid are associated with lower shares of tax to GDP in developing countries, while Bourguignon et al. (2005) 
identified that tax effort increased when aid increased in a study of 11 African countries.  
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countries, by Nyoni (1998) in the case of Tanzania, and by Sackey (2002) in the case of Ghana. 
Mixed results have been identified for Pacific countries by Fielding (2007).  
 
Arguably, there are other more important constraints to expanding the export sector in 
developing countries and the adverse effects of aid on a recipient’s RER may be overstated. 
Barder (2006) argues that it is very unlikely that increases in foreign aid will lead to Dutch disease 
impacts if aid flows are sustained and predictable. Gupta et al. (2006) demonstrate that the 
likelihood of Dutch disease impacts from aid depends on how much aid is spent (rather than 
accumulated as reserves) and how much is ‘absorbed’ (where foreign exchange is used to 
purchase imports). Whether the recipient economy is supply constrained is likely to be an 
important factor mediating the impact of aid on the recipient’s RER and its export 
competitiveness.  
 
2.4 Donor practices 
An additional constraint on the ability of recipients to absorb more aid effectively stems from 
the way in which aid is delivered by the international community. Developing countries are 
usually recipients of aid from a large number of donors. As noted above, the delivery of aid 
imposes an administrative burden on recipient country public sector officials. This administrative 
burden becomes larger when donors work in isolation from one another and use different 
procedures for monitoring and evaluation. As donors scale-up foreign aid, the burden will be 
further exacerbated by an increasing number of donors and a high degree of donor proliferation 
and fragmentation. The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness seeks to minimise this 
burden. 
 
Donor proliferation relates to donors providing aid to a large number of recipient countries, 
implying that each individual recipient has to deal with a large number of donors. Fragmentation 
refers to donors funding a large number of projects and programs across different sectors, which 
often results in duplication. There is a growing body of literature which documents the 
constraints caused by poor donor practices. The impacts and degree of donor proliferation and 
fragmentation have been identified by Morss (1984), Knack and Rahman (2004), Acharya et al. 
(2006) and Roodman (2006). Importantly, donor proliferation and fragmentation are likely to 
increase in the future with the scaling up of aid.  
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Donors are also responsible for other aspects of aid delivery which could hamper its 
effectiveness. Volatile and unpredictable aid flows have a disruptive impact on annual budgets 
and fiscal planning. Studies have identified a high degree of volatility in aid flows, which hampers 
aid effectiveness and has been shown to increase over time (Lensink and Morrissey, 2000; Dollar 
and Levin, 2005; Bulíř and Hamann, 2008; Fielding and Mavrotas, 2008). Aid flows are found to 
be more volatile than other sources of government revenue and volatility is also likely to increase 
with the scaling up of aid. In summary, the constraints engendered by poor donor practices on 
the ability of countries to absorb more aid are clearly important, and this remains undisputed in 
the literature. 
 
2.5 Social and cultural factors 
Social and cultural factors also represent a constraint on the effective use of additional aid flows. 
These constraints relate to a lack of demand for health and education services in some 
developing countries. Even if school and clinics are built and are well staffed, people may not 
necessarily attend them (de Renzio, 2005; Clemens et al., 2007). Relieving such constraints lies 
beyond the scope of international donors but should be a consideration when scaling up aid 
programs in particular countries.  
 
3. Measuring the absorptive capacity of developing countries 
It is important to clearly motivate the development of the paper’s CIAC, given recent critiques 
of composite or ‘mashup’ indices (Ravallion, 2010). The CIAC is developed in order to assist 
donors allocating their annual aid budgets across developing countries. This is important given 
the strong evidence of diminishing returns to aid and that that low levels of absorptive capacity 
limit aid effectiveness. The CIAC is designed to capture the most important factors which inhibit 
the effectiveness of aid at a country level. Importantly, country rankings, based on the CIAC are 
shown to be robust to different weightings of the index components. The index can be used to 
augment existing aid allocation models and replace other ad hoc measures of institutional capacity 
and policy strength. Ceteris paribus, higher levels of aid should be provided to countries with 
higher levels of absorptive capacity and vice versa. 
 
The index needs to meet a number of criteria to be of use for policymakers, including a very high 
level of country coverage and a high degree of simplicity for the sake of transparency and 
duplication. This paper therefore devises an index which incorporates data that are available for a 
large number of countries, and which is easy to calculate and update. The inclusion of the 
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specific components of the index, the proxies used to measure them and the robustness of the 
index rankings with respect to alternative weighting systems are discussed below. 
 
Drawing on the review of the aid effectiveness literature presented above, the CIAC incorporates 
three major components of absorptive capacity: (i) capital constraints (including human capital 
and infrastructure constraints); (ii) governance constraints (including policy and institutional 
constraints); and (iii) donor practices. This choice of constraints as index components is strongly 
justified by the findings of the aid effectiveness literature concerning their importance. There is a 
very broad consensus throughout the literature that each of these constraints can hamper the use 
of additional aid. Moreover, data that can adequately measure these constraints is widely available 
for developing countries. While less importance is attached to the other two constraints 
discussed in Section 2 (macroeconomic and social/cultural), they might still be relevant to certain 
countries. Donors can augment the CIAC with other country specific information where 
appropriate. 
 
These types of constraints, how they are measured and the source of data are presented in Table 
1 below. Descriptive statistics for all of the variables are provided in Table A1 of the appendix.  
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Table 1: Components of the index of absorptive capacity 
Component Measurement Source Year 
Capital    
Human capital (i) Number of doctors per thousand people  
(ii) Number of nurses per thousand people  
(iii) Number of primary school teachers per 
thousand people 
(iv) Number of secondary school teachers per 
thousand people 
(v) Adult illiteracy 
 
World Bank (2009a) Latest 
available 
Infrastructure (i) Paved roads (per cent of total) 
 
World Bank (2009a) Latest 
available 
Governance    
Policy/ 
institutional 
(i) Voice and accountability 
(ii) Political instability 
(iii) Government effectiveness 
(iv) Regulatory quality 
(v) Rule of law 
(vi) Control of corruption 
 
World Bank (2009b) 2008 
Donor    
Donor practices (i) Ratio of the number of DAC donors to the log 
of government expenditures. 
(ii) Ratio of fragmentation (number of donors 
accounting for less than 10 per cent of Country 
Programmable Aid (CPA)) to the log of 
government expenditures. 
OECD (2009a) 
 
2005/06 
average 
 
The choice of the variables employed to measure the three constraints warrants some discussion. 
All of the variables provide important information relating to the key constraints that have been 
identified by the literature as hampering the effectiveness of foreign aid.  
 
The health and education sectors are assuming ever greater importance as donors scale-up aid in 
attempts to achieve the MDGs. However, a shortage of skilled professionals in these sectors will 
limit the productive use of additional financial resources. Proxies for human capital constraints 
therefore include the number of doctors, nurses and primary and secondary school teachers per 
thousand people. A skilled civil service is also required to handle high levels of foreign aid. Much 
foreign aid is provided directly to recipient governments placing large administrative and other 
demands on government staff. An adult literacy variable is included as a proxy for the capacity of 
the staff in recipient public sectors. Physical capital constraints are captured by the extent of 
paved roads. This is justified on the grounds that a lack of road infrastructure will impede the 
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delivery of basic services even when additional resources are available. To achieve the MDGs, 
more remote locations of recipient countries need to be targeted and poor road systems will 
increase the costs and weaken the viability of servicing remote communities. 
 
Proxies for the policy and institutional constraints include the World Bank’s governance 
indicators. These indicators have excellent coverage for developing countries, have been used in 
numerous empirical studies and are correlated with other measures of institutional strength. It is 
assumed that countries with low values for governance have less capacity to utilize additional aid 
flows effectively and that returns to aid funded investments will be lower. The quality of donor 
practices is measured using the number of donors providing aid to the recipient and the extent 
of aid fragmentation (both as a ratio to the log of government expenditures). These variables 
capture the donor imposed administrative burden associated with aid. The greater the number of 
donors and the higher the level of fragmentation, the more time recipient public sectors spend 
on aid administration. Although these constraints could be relieved over the long term (including 
through the use of aid), they will be binding in the short term, restricting the effectiveness of aid.  
 
The sensitivity of country rankings from a composite index to the weightings attached to the 
index components must be examined. Three methods for weighting the different components 
(constraints) of the composite index are adopted. The sensitivity of country rankings and policy 
implications to these different methods are analysed and discussed in Section 4 below.  
 
In the first method, an equally weighted index is constructed. Each of the 14 variables used to 
measure the four different constraints are standardised to lie between zero and one.8 The 
variables are averaged at a constraint level to provide an indication of the importance of the 
three different constraints at a country level. The values for the three different constraints are 
then combined with an equal weighting to calculate the CIAC. Using this method, the index is 
calculated for all 140 recipients of ODA (in 2007) even in cases where data are not available for 
all of the variables. The index is referred to as CIAC1.  
 
                                                 
8 The governance variables are constructed so that they have an effective range of -3 to 3. These variables are scaled 
to lie in a range (0,1) by adding 3 to each value then dividing it by six. A score of close to one (zero) indicates that 
the level of governance enables a high (low) level of absorptive capacity. A similar procedure is applied to the 
variables that represent capital constraints. Actual values are divided by the maximum value for each variable. This 
gives a score from zero to one where one (zero) indicates a high (low) level of absorptive capacity. For the donor 
constraint variable, the following formula was applied (maximum value-actual value)/maximum value.  This was so 
that the score was reversed to provide a consistent interpretation with the other constraints. 
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CIAC1 can be criticised on its equal weighting of its various components. At the same time, 
assigning different weights to the different dimensions of absorptive capacity must be readily 
justifiable. Factor analysis provides a useful and widely used method for calculating alternative 
weights for the index components, particularly when the variables used in the construction of an 
index are correlated. Factor analysis is a statistical technique that groups variables according to 
their degree of co-movement. Variables are grouped into (fewer) factors according to their co-
movements.  
 
The latent components of the index of absorptive capacity are defined by the number and 
composition of the groupings. A (factor) score can be calculated at the constraint level and a 
composite index is devised by combining the factor scores for each country. Each factor 
indicates which set of variables have the most association with it. Two methods of combining 
the factor scores are utilised. The first takes a simple average of the factor scores and the 
resulting index is referred to as CIAC2. The second takes a weighted average of the factor scores, 
with the weights determined by the relative proportion of the total variance explained. This 
composite index is referred to as CIAC3.9 The Further details of the factor analysis are provided 
in the appendix.  
 
4. Analysis and discussion 
This section seeks to confirm that the composite index created by the paper is relevant to the 
analysis of aid effectiveness. This is achieved by employing the CIAC in a standard empirical 
growth model.10 Variable descriptions and their sources are provided in Table A2. The 
specification of the model largely follows that of Burnside and Dollar (2000), Hansen and Tarp 
(2001) and Rajan and Subramanian (2008). Unfortunately, data availability restricts the 
measurement of absorptive capacity through time. This paper calculates the CIAC using the 
latest available data from 2000. Since levels of absorptive capacity will change over time (albeit 
slowly), the sample period for empirical estimations is restricted to six 3-year periods from 1990 
to 2005. 
 
Results from the estimation of the model using different estimation techniques are provided in 
Table 2. Column (1) provides results from the Least Squares Dummy Variables (LSDV) method 
                                                 
9 Note that these indices cannot be calculated for countries with missing data for any of the variables.  
10 Results presented below are for CIAC1 and are broadly very similar to the results for CIAC2 and CIAC3. 
Additional results are available from the author upon request.  
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of estimating equation (1) (from Section 2 above). Aid variables are lagged one period to control 
for their potential endogeneity. Aid and aid-squared variables are included and confirm the 
finding of diminishing returns. The coefficients attached to these variables are positive and 
negative respectively and are statistically significant. In the second model the aid–squared 
variable is replaced with an aid*CIAC interaction.11 While the coefficient attached to the aid 
variable is negative, the positive and statistically significant coefficient attached to the aid-CIAC 
interaction term indicates that the impact of aid on growth is higher in recipients with higher 
levels of absorptive capacity. Results are provided in column (2). Column (3) presents the results 
from fixed effects estimation and the results with respect to aid are confirmed. Column (4) 
provides results from GMM system estimation, the preferred method of estimation by much of 
the recent literature which treats aid as endogenous. Results from GMM estimation pass the 
Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation and the validity of instruments are confirmed using the 
Hansen J- test for overidentifying restrictions. The coefficient attached to the aid-CIAC 
interaction terms is positive and statistically significant. All available lags are used as instruments 
but results remain unchanged with different instrument lag lengths. Overall, the results from 
these empirical estimations provide very strong support for the relevance of the index for 
policymakers. 
 
                                                 
11 A high level of collinearity between the aid, aid squared and aid CIAC interaction variables prevents them 
from entering the same regression specification.  
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Table 2: Empirical results (dependent variable is average annual growth of real per 
capita GDP (PPP)) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 LSDV LSDV FE GMM-SYS 
 
Constant 10.151 2.586 3.630 4.692 
 (5.39)*** (1.66)* (6.23)*** (4.86)*** 
Initial GDP per capita -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (2.71)*** (0.87) (0.97) (0.38) 
Ethnic fractionalisation -14.363 -0.598 - -2.795 
 (3.54)*** (0.16) - (2.52)** 
Assassinations -0.019 0.041 0.041 -0.135 
 (0.05) (0.11) (0.08) (0.45) 
Ethnic*Assassinations -0.586 -0.699 -0.699 0.028 
 (0.74) (0.88) (0.57) (0.04) 
Inflation -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (2.20)** (2.21)** (2.39)** (2.42)** 
Trade openness 1.570 1.391 1.391 1.236 
 (3.02)*** (2.67)*** (2.37)** (2.65)*** 
Aid to GDP (lagged) 0.189 -0.465 -0.465  
 (2.15)** (2.95)*** (3.01)***  
Aid to GDP Squared (lagged) -0.003    
 (2.15)**    
Aid*CIAC (lagged)  1.651 1.651  
  (3.16)*** (3.40)***  
Aid to GDP    -0.372 
    (1.90)* 
Aid*CIAC    1.411 
    (2.00)** 
     
Observations 463 434 434 440 
R-squared 0.50 0.48 - - 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions include period 
dummies. 
 
The paper proceeds by examining the sensitivity of country rankings to different CIACs (with 
different constraint weightings). Table 3 below presents the rank correlations between the 
different aggregate indices of absorptive capacity. It indicates that there is a very high degree of 
correlation between the three different composite indices. This implies that rankings and policy 
recommendations based on rankings of absorptive capacity change very little with the index 
employed. 
 
Table 3: Correlations between alternative methods 
 CIAC1 CIAC2 
CIAC2 0.95  
CIAC3 0.87 0.97
Note: Correlations are based on the 66 nations that are common to all three applications 
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For the donor community, low levels of absorptive capacity in recipient countries constitute a 
particularly important issue if these countries are also receiving high levels of foreign aid. Table 4 
below lists 15 countries which have low levels of absorptive capacity (with a CIAC1 score below 
0.5) but receive high levels of foreign aid relative to their GDP (greater than 15 per cent). 
 
Table 4: Countries with low absorptive capacity receiving high amounts of foreign aid  
Country ODA/GDP 
(%) 
CIAC 
Liberia 94.7 0.28 
Timor-Leste 70.0 0.26 
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. 48.3 0.50 
Burundi 47.6 0.24 
Solomon Islands 46.7 0.43 
Afghanistan 38.9 0.13 
Guinea-Bissau 32.3 0.28 
Sierra Leone 32.2 0.28 
Sao Tome and Principe 24.8 0.42 
Mozambique 22.2 0.25 
Rwanda 20.9 0.25 
Malawi 20.5 0.31 
Kiribati 19.8 0.39 
Iraq 17.9 0.34 
Tanzania 16.7 0.33 
Note: Countries listed are those with CIAC1 scores<0.5 and which receive a level of 
ODA exceeding 15 per cent of GDP. ODA data are sourced from the OECD (2011b). 
 
Nine of the 15 countries are located in Africa and most are experiencing conflict or post-conflict 
episodes. Nonetheless, the list includes six SIDS, four of which are located in the Pacific 
(Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and the Solomon Islands). The list also includes three 
countries located in Asia (Afghanistan, Iraq and Timor-Leste).  
 
Another way of examining whether countries are receiving appropriate levels of aid is to estimate 
the specific threshold at which diminishing returns sets in for each individual country. In order 
to do this, it is assumed that for a country with an average CIAC, this threshold is where aid 
accounts for 20 per cent of a recipient’s GDP. This is justified on the basis that aid growth 
studies find that this threshold exists for the average developing country. The threshold is 
adjusted for individual countries by scaling it by a factor equal to its CIAC score relative to the 
average CIAC. Results from this exercise are provided in Table 5. 
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Table 5: Levels of ODA Versus Estimated Diminishing Return Thresholds 
Country ODA/GDP (%) Estimated 
ODA/GDP 
Threshold (%) 
Afghanistan 38.9 6.5 
Burundi 47.6 12.0 
Burkina Faso 13.8 13.0 
Djibouti 13.8 13.5 
Eritrea 11.3 11.0 
Ethiopia 12.5 12.0 
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. 48.3 17.0 
Guinea-Bissau 32.3 14.0 
Iraq 17.9 17.0 
Kiribati 19.8 19.5 
Liberia 94.7 14.0 
Marshall Islands 34.9 19.0 
Mali 14.9 14.0 
Mozambique 22.2 12.5 
Malawi 20.5 15.5 
Niger 12.8 12.5 
Rwanda 20.9 12.5 
Solomon Islands 46.7 12.5 
Sierra Leone 32.2 14.0 
Sao Tome and Principe 24.8 21.0 
Timor-Leste 70.0 11.5 
Tanzania 16.7 16.5 
Uganda 14.5 14.0 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 12.2 10.5 
 
Table 5 indicates that 24 countries received a level of aid in 2008 which exceeded their 
diminishing returns threshold. Importantly, eight countries are receiving a level of aid which is 
more than twice their estimated diminishing returns threshold. These countries are highlighted in 
bold. Drawing on Figure 1 presented earlier, these results imply that these countries might be 
experiencing negative (rather than diminishing returns) to foreign aid. As discussed in the 
conclusion below, donors should examine closely the levels and impacts of their assistance to 
these countries.12 
 
                                                 
12 Note that many (but not all) of these countries are low income countries If levels of absorptive capacity are highly 
correlated with income levels, this raises questions as to the usefulness of the CIAC as an additional variable to 
consider when allocating aid. The correlation coefficient between CIAC1 and GDP per capita is 0.71. Furthermore, 
regressing CIAC1 on GDP per capita yields an R-squared of 0.50. This implies that 50 per cent of the variation in 
CIAC1 is not explained by GDP per capita. Therefore, the CIAC clearly provides different and additional 
information vis-à-vis GDP per capita. Moreover, the ratio of disbursements to commitments is sometimes used to 
infer a level of absorptive capacity. If this ratio is low, it might indicate that a country is unable to spend its current 
level of aid due to bottlenecks and absorptive capacity constraints. Yet the ratio can also be influenced by emergency 
aid and the failure of donors to disburse such aid. The correlation between CIAC1 and this ratio of just -0.20 
indicates that the disbursement to commitment ratio is a poor proxy for absorptive capacity. These findings remain 
unchanged when the other CIACs are used.  
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5. Conclusion and policy recommendations 
There is strong evidence to suggest that absorptive capacity constraints can hamper the 
effectiveness of foreign aid. This issue is becoming increasingly important as the international 
community scales up its level of assistance to developing countries. The issue of absorptive 
capacity therefore needs to be systematically considered by donors when allocating their aid 
otherwise there is a risk that additional aid flows will not lead to progress towards the MDGs or 
yield other desired outcomes. Disillusionment around foreign aid could spread, and support for 
future foreign assistance might weaken.  
 
Existing models of aid allocation seek to allocate a fixed budget of funds across all developing 
countries according to their size, level of need and a measure of performance or ability to use aid 
effectively. Commonly, the measure of performance is determined by a country’s policy and 
institutional environment. While this represents one component of a recipient’s absorptive 
capacity, it is far too limited. As demonstrated by the paper, absorptive capacity relates to a 
number of recipient country characteristics. A CIAC is therefore devised which can augment aid 
allocation models and ensure a more appropriate global distribution of aid. The relevance of the 
index to aid effectiveness is confirmed in a growth regression and country rankings are robust to 
alternative weightings of the index components. 
 
A number of countries are highlighted which have low levels of absorptive capacity but are 
receiving high levels of foreign aid. Levels of assistance to these countries should be examined 
closely to ensure desired outcomes are being achieved. These countries clearly do not provide a 
strong case for additional aid as donors continue to scale up.  
 
While it can be argued that absorptive capacity constraints can be relieved by aid itself, this takes 
time and the effectiveness of aid at achieving this goal is sometimes questioned. Relieving human 
capital and policy and institutional constraints is particularly challenging and is only likely to 
occur over a long timeframe. In countries with low levels of absorptive capacity, donors must 
ensure their programs are either effectively relieving existing constraints or that they are working 
around them.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Descriptive statistics for absorptive capacity constraint variables 
Variable Minimum Maximum Median Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Primary school teachers per 1000 people 1.32 11.70 4.91 5.14 1.92 
Secondary school teachers per 1000 people 0.55 15.35 4.79 4.87 3.25 
Paved roads (per cent of total) 0.80 100.00 27.80 38.39 30.85 
Doctors per 1000 people 0.02 5.91 0.49 0.98 1.16 
Nurses per 1000 people 0.19 12.51 1.50 2.33 2.51 
Adult literacy 26.18 99.79 84.28 77.79 20.03 
Voice and accountability -2.24 1.24 -0.29 -0.40 0.80 
Political instability -3.28 1.40 -0.21 -0.36 0.87 
Government effectiveness -2.51 1.48 -0.56 -0.48 0.63 
Regulatory quality -2.77 1.58 -0.46 -0.48 0.70 
Rule of law -2.69 1.28 -0.54 -0.49 0.64 
Control of corruption -1.90 1.32 -0.53 -0.46 0.59 
Number of donors 2 30 20 18.12 6.52 
Fragmentation 0 25 13 12.17 5.63 
Donors/log(Govt Exp.) 0.12 1.44 1.01 0.95 0.34 
Fragmentation/log(Govt Exp.) 0.04 1.02 0.7 0.66 0.28 
Notes: See Table 1 for Variable Description, sample size varies between 115 and 140. 
 
Table A2: Description and source of variables used in the empirical analysis 
Variable 
 
Description Source 
GDP per capita growth Annual average growth in real GDP per capita 
(PPP)  
Penn World Tables  
Initial GDP per capita GDP per capita (PPP) at the beginning of each 
period (logged) 
World Bank (2010) 
Ethnic fractionalisation Chance that two people drawn at random from 
the population will speak the same language 
Roodman (2004) 
Assassinations Number of assassinations per capita Roodman (2004) 
Population Population World Bank (2010) 
Inflation Average annual rate of growth in the Consumer 
Price Index (CPI) 
World Bank (2010) 
Trade Sachs-Warner trade openness index. (values for 
1998 used for years after 1998) 
Roodman (2004) 
Aid to GDP Ratio of Net Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) to GDP 
OECD (2010) 
CIAC1, CIAC2, CIAC3 Composite Indices of Absorptive Capacity Authors calculations 
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Factor analysis 
The calculation of CIAC2 includes all 14 variables listed in Table A3 and is calculated for 90 
countries. Presented below is the factor loading matrix with three columns, each representing a 
latent component of absorptive capacity. 
 
Table A3: Factor Loading Matrix (N=66)   
Variable Governance 
(Factor 1) 
Capital 
(Factor 2) 
Donors 
(Factor 3) 
Primary school teachers per 1000 people 0.206  -0.527 
Secondary school teachers per 1000 people  0.863 -0.206 
Paved roads (per cent of total)  0.565 -0.138 
Doctors per 1000 people  0.93  
Nurses per 1000 people  0.823  
Adult literacy 0.282 0.709  
Voice and accountability 0.62 -0.113  
Political instability 0.61 0.25 -0.254 
Government effectiveness 0.936 0.147  
Regulatory quality 0.859 0.159 0.101 
Rule of law 0.92  -0.19 
Control of corruption 0.893  -0.211 
Number of donors  -0.372 0.88 
Fragmentation  -0.213 0.946 
Note: Factor Loadings between -0.1 and 0.1 are supressed 
 
The numbers in Table A3 are typically referred to as factor loadings. These loadings can be 
thought of as correlations, in particular, how the variables correlate with a particular factor. 
Loadings above 0.5 in magnitude are highlighted to help identify the different factors. The first 
factor has been denoted as Governance as the variables that define this factor (i.e. that have the 
highest loading) all relate to governance.   
 
The second factor clearly measures Capital, as all the variables that load highly define the stock of 
physical and human capital. The third factor, Donors, primarily measures donor characteristics. 
This last factor is also determined by the number of primary school teachers per 1000 people. 
While it is expected that this variable belongs in the Capital factor, it is only marginally above 0.5 
in magnitude and can be attributed to an aberration in the data rather than as a variable which 
defines the factor. 
 
Unlike the first two factors, Donors measures the lack of absorptive capacity. As the level of 
Governance and Capital increases, a country’s ability to absorb aid increases. However, as the 
number and fragmentation of donors increase a nation’s capacity to absorb aid would be 
 26
expected to decrease. This negative relationship is consistent with the negative factor loading of 
primary school teachers.  
 
In order to increase the sample of countries for which CIAC3 is created, two variables are 
omitted from the analysis: adult literacy and paved roads. The results of this exercise are 
presented in Table A4 below. 
 
Table A4: Factor Loading Matrix (N=82) 
Variable Governance 
(Factor 1) 
Donors 
(Factor 2) 
Capital 
(Factor 3) 
Primary school teachers per 1000 people 0.281 -0.485  
Secondary school teachers per 1000 people  -0.213 0.854 
Doctors per 1000 people   0.872 
Nurses per 1000 people  -0.148 0.781 
Voice and accountability 0.665 -0.132  
Political instability 0.553 -0.372 0.112 
Government effectiveness 0.943  0.14 
Regulatory quality 0.87  0.166 
Rule of law 0.919 -0.211  
Control of corruption 0.897 -0.241  
Number of donors -0.106 0.913 -0.25 
Fragmentation  0.988 -0.108 
Note: Factor Loadings between -0.1 and 0.1 are supressed 
 
An important feature of this table is that the factors are defined in the same way as in Table A3. 
This is despite the inclusion of an additional 16 countries. Therefore, the latent variables 
Governance, Donor and Capital appear to provide robust factors. The only discernable difference 
between Tables A5 and A6 is that the order in which the factors appear has changed. This 
indicates that the relative importance of the factors has changed (albeit marginally). Importance 
is typically measured by the proportion of variance explained. In both cases the three factors 
collectively explain at least 70 per cent of the variation in the dataset; and in both cases the 
Governance factor captures approximately 30 per cent of the variation. In the first application the 
Donor factor captures 16 per cent of the variation whereas in the second instance it represents 20 
per cent of the variation. The results for Capital are 24 percent and 19 percent for the first and 
second applications respectively. 
 
In Table A5 the correlations between the individual constraints from CIAC1, CIAC2 and CIAC3 
are presented. The results in this table indicate that there is a high correlation between all three 
methods. This implies that the simple CIAC1 methodology is providing very similar information 
as the approaches based on factor analysis denoted by CIAC2 and CIAC3. 
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TableA5: Correlations at the factor level 
  Governance (CIAC1) Governance (CIAC3) 
Governance (CIAC2) 0.96 0.99 
Governance (CIAC3) 0.95   
      
  Capital (CIAC1) Capital (CIAC3) 
Capital (CIAC2) 0.96 0.99 
Capital (CIAC3) 0.93   
      
  Donor (CIAC1) Donor (CIAC3) 
Donor (CIAC2) 0.96 0.99 
Donor (CIAC3) 0.96   
Note: Correlations are based on the 66 countries that are common to the three indices. 
 
 
 
 
